We conducted three experiments on social problem solving by chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a subordinate and a dominant individual competed for food, which was placed in various ways on the subordinate's side of two opaque barriers. In some conditions dominants had not seen the food hidden, or food they had seen hidden was moved elsewhere when they were not watching (whereas in control conditions they saw the food being hidden or moved). At the same time, subordinates always saw the entire baiting procedure and could monitor the visual access of their dominant competitor as well. If subordinates were sensitive to what dominants did or did not see during baiting, they should have preferentially approached and retrieved the food that dominants had not seen hidden or moved. This is what they did in experiment 1 when dominants were either uninformed or misinformed about the food's location. In experiment 2 subordinates recognized, and adjusted their behaviour accordingly, when the dominant individual who witnessed the hiding was replaced with another dominant individual who had not witnessed it, thus demonstrating their ability to keep track of precisely who has witnessed what. In experiment 3 subordinates did not choose consistently between two pieces of hidden food, one of which dominants had seen hidden and one of which they had not seen hidden. However, their failure in this experiment was likely to be due to the changed nature of the competition under these circumstances and not to a failure of social-cognitive skills. These findings suggest that at least in some situations (i.e. competition with conspecifics) chimpanzees know what conspecifics have and have not seen (do and do not know), and that they use this information to devise effective social-cognitive strategies.
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A recurrent theme in the study of primate cognition is the discrepancy between the cognitive skills that individuals seem to display in more natural settings and those that can be rigorously demonstrated in more controlled experimental settings. A case in point is the skills of chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, in understanding what conspecifics do and do not see. Some researchers have reported anecdotes and other naturalistic observations of chimpanzees that seemingly demonstrate this ability (see Byrne & Whiten 1992) . For example, Goodall (1971) reported that an individual who had spied fruit in a tree actively refrained from retrieving it, or even looking at it, when others were present (retrieving it only after the others had left the area). de Waal (1982) reported that chimpanzees sometimes actively hide parts of their body with their hands (e.g. fear grimaces), presumably so that groupmates will not be able to see signals of their emotional state (see also Tanner & Byrne 1993, for a similar behaviour in gorillas, Gorilla gorilla). In other, more systematic studies, chimpanzees visually followed the gaze direction of both conspecifics and humans even around barriers and past distracters (e.g. Povinelli & Eddy 1997; Tomasello et al. 1998 Tomasello et al. , 1999 .
In two experimental paradigms, however, chimpanzees have seemingly failed to show an understanding of what others can and cannot see. First, chimpanzees given the choice of begging from a human who can see them versus one who cannot chose indiscriminately in all but the simplest conditions (Povinelli & Eddy 1996a; Reaux et al. 1999) . That is, although they chose appropriately when one human was facing them and the other had her back turned, they chose indiscriminately when one human's view was occluded but the other's was not (e.g. when one human had a bucket over his head and the other did not). Second, when chimpanzees were given the task of finding food hidden somewhere in a row of opaque containers most individuals did not use human gaze as a cue for finding it, although some did (e.g. Povinelli & Eddy
